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INSURANCE CONTRACTS -
Right to Proceeds of Vendor's Insurance
Where Property Conditionally Sold
By MICHAEL J. KENNEDY*
IT IS BY no means settled in California who is entitled to the pro-
ceeds of a fire insurance policy on property which has been sold under
a conditional sales contract when the subject matter of the contract is
destroyed. It is the purpose of this comment to point up the several
aspects of the problem and analyze their relative merits.
The Problem
A surface understanding of the problem can be had by resort to
a contract for the sale of land.1 Assume: a vendor and purchaser enter
into a conditional contract for the sale of buildings and the land on
which the buildings are situate. The purchaser makes a down payment
and takes possession; the vendor retains legal title as security for the
balance of the purchase price. Vendor insures his interest in buildings
with an insurance company in his own name and pays all the premiums.
The purchaser does not insure his interest. While the contract is still
executory, the buildings are destroyed by fire through no fault of the
purchaser or vendor. The purchase contract is silent as to who is
entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The liabilities of the parties
at this point are that the purchasor is liable to the vendor for the
balance of the purchase price because the risk of loss is on the pur-
chaser since he was in possession and in California the risk of loss
follows possession.2 The insurer is liable to the vendor on the insur-
ance policy. The purchaser claims that the insurance money should
be applied to the balance of the purchase price. The vendor claims
that he is entitled to the benefits of both of his contracts and that he
should get the balance of the purchase price from the purchaser and
the insurance money from the insurance company. The insurance
company, on the other hand, claims that if it has to pay on the insur-
ance policy, it has the right to be subrogated to the vendor's cause of
*Member, Second Year class.
1 A contract for the sale of realty is used here only for purposes of simplicity. The
problem is not unique to land contracts, and the analysis applies to all conditional sale
contracts, for personalty as well as realty.
2 CAL. Cry. CODE § 1662 (Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act): "'... (b) If,
when either legal title or possession of the subject matter of the contract has been trans-
ferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed without fault of vendor..., purchaser is not
thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled to recover any portion
thereof that he has paid."
[ 420 J
COMMENTS
action against the purchaser for the balance of the purchase price.
Now the court must decide whose claim to sustain.
Attempted Solutions in California
California courts have been confronted with this problem twice,
and there is one federal decision which purportedly resolves it on the
basis of California law. In White v. Gilman,3 the vendor contracted
to sell a lot to the purchaser. The purchaser took possession, made a
couple of payments and built a dwelling on the lot. The vendor in-
sured the dwelling on his own behalf. The dwelling was destroyed
by fire, and the insurance company paid the vendor on the policy.
In the purchaser's suit to have the insurance money applied to the
balance of the purchase price, the California Supreme Court dismissed
the suit and held that the insurance money belonged solely to the
vendor, that the purchaser had no interest in the insurance money,
and that the purchaser could not have it applied to the purchase price.
Thus, the first time the issue was raised in California the purchaser
was held not entitled to the benefits of the vendor's insurance, and the
vendor was allowed to retain the insurance money and recover the
balance of the purchase price.
A few years later the situation arose in a similar context in the
case of Kaufman v. All Persons.4 In Kaufman, the vendor obtained
a loan from the defendant and gave a deed of trust on a building as
security for the loan. In compliance with the loan agreement the
vendor secured insurance on the building payable to the defendant.
Thereafter the vendor contracted to sell the building, subject to the
deed of trust, to the plaintiff-purchaser. The plaintiff agreed to pay
a specified sum to the vendor and to assume the vendor's indebtedness
to the defendant. The building was destroyed by fire, and the insur-
ance company paid the defendant. The plaintiff brought suit to have
the insurance money applied against the plaintiff's assumed indebted-
ness to the defendant. Without reference to, or even acknowledgement
of, White v. Gilman, the district court of appeal allowed the plaintiff's
claim and held that the plaintiff acquired an equitable interest in the
proceeds of the insurance policy as an incident to her equitable title
under the agreement of sale; so the plaintiff was entitled to have the
proceeds of the policy applied upon the mortgage indebtedness as-
sumed by her.
Thus, under two similar fact situations the California courts have
reached two diverse results. The only other decision in point is a
federal case, In re Future Mfg. Co-op.,5 where the vendor made a
conditional sales contract to sell personalty to the purchaser, and the
vendor insured his own interest. When the property was destroyed
3 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903).
4 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911).
5 165 F. Supp. 111 (N. D. Cal. 1958).
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by fire, the purchaser still owed the vendor the balance of the purchase
price. The insurance company paid the vendor on the policy. The
purchaser went into bankruptcy, and in the proceeding the insurance
company sought to be subrogated to the vendor's rights against the
purchaser for the balance of the purchase price. The vendor sought
the balance of the purchase price, and the purchaser claimed that the
proceeds of the vendor's insurance should be applied to the balance
of the purchase price owed by the purchaser to the vendor. The court
found for the purchaser and held that he was entitled to the benefits
of the vendor's insurance. The court overruled the vendor's claim and
held that he could not get the balance of the purchase price and also
retain the insurance money because this would constitute double in-
demnification. As to the insurance company's claim, the court held
that the company would only be entitled to subrogation to the in-
sured's rights against one who had wrongfully caused the loss; there-
fore, the insurance company was not entitled to be subrogated.
The court in the Future case discussed both the White and the
Kaufman cases but distinguished them and held that neither con-
trolled. The White decision was discarded as authority on the grounds
that it did not apply when the property which was the subject of the
sales contract was destroyed. 6 Although the court in Future felt that
the Kaufman decision was the California case ". . . most nearly in
point,"7 it was deemed not controlling because it did not deal with
the relationship of vendor and vendee. Having distinguished8 the
only available authorities in California, and conceded that there were
no cases in California directly on the point, the federal court disposed
of the case on the basis of what the court thought the California Su-
preme Court would do. The federal court's decision is, of course, not
binding on the California courts.
From a look at the available California law on the issue, it would
appear that California is not definitely committed to any one of the
three possible alternatives and that the California courts are free to
pick and apply the solution which best disposes of the fact situation
before them. An analysis of the three alternatives is now in order with
an eye toward picking that one which most reasonably conforms to
common sense and sound legal principles.
Three Alternative Solutions
The three possible solutions of the controversy are: to subrogate
the insurer to the vendor-insured's cause of action against the pur-
6 Id. at 114.
7 Ibid.
8 The writer is not here concerned with the validity of the federal court's distinctions
of White v. Gilman, supra note 3, and Kaufman v. All Persons, supra note 4, but it may
be noted that neither distinction is so soundly based as to preclude scrutiny and criticism,
and it is hoped that the California courts will not summarily limit the doctrines of the two
cases without the consideration they deserve.
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chaser for the balance of the purchase price; to give the purchaser
the benefit of the vendor's insurance; or to allow the vendor to retain
the insurance money and recover the balance of the purchase price
from the purchaser. As will be pointed out below, all three are ob-
jectionable.
Subrogation
An analysis of the insurance company's claim that it is entitled to
subrogation necessitates a look at the essence and requirements of the
doctrine of subrogation. In the law of insurance, subrogation is the
process of equitable substitution by which the insurer who has paid
for the loss under the policy succeeds to any rights the insured may
have against any person who is primarily responsible for the loss.9
There are three prerequisites to an insurer's right to subrogation against
a third party: that the third party be primarily liable to the insured
for the property loss or damage; that the insurer be secondarily liable
for some or all of this loss by a contract of indemnity; and finally, that
the insurer have paid the insured under the insurance policy.10
The second and third requisites are not troublesome. However,
that the first requisite is not fulfilled seems to be the greatest objection
to subrogation; that is, where the third party has not wrongfully caused
the loss and is not primarily responsible, should the insurer be subro-
gated to the insured's collateral causes of action against that third
party? It is generally agreed that the insurer should be subrogated
to the vendor's rights against one who has wrongfully caused the loss,"
but here the vendor's cause of action sounds in tort. Where the ven-
dor's cause of action sounds in contract rather than tort, the courts
have more often than not refused to allow subrogation to a contract
cause of action against one who has not wrongfully caused the loss.' 2
In California the rule seems to be that the insurer may be subro-
gated to the insured's cause of action against anyone who has wrong-
fully caused or is primarily responsible for the loss, regardless of
9 VANCE, INSURANCE § 422 (lst ed. 1904).
10 King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 62, 63
(1951).
11 Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunwoody, 194 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1952). See author-
ities collected in 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDiA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1997, nn.6 & 7, at 6590-91
(1931). Home Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 140 Me. 72, 34 A.2d 22 (1943).
'12 American Cas. Ins. Co. v. Weller, 106 Ore. 494, 212 Pac. 803 (1923); Nelson v.
Bound Brook Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 43 N.J.Eq. 256, 11 Ad. 681 (1887); Washington Fire
Ind. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 (1870); Benjamin v. Saratoga County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
17 N.Y. 415 (1858). Contra, Nobbe v. Equity Fire Ins. Co., 210 Minn. 93, 297 N.W.
349 (1941); Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95, 152 N.E.
476 (1926); see dicta in Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunwoody, 194 F.2d 666, 667-68
(9th Cir. 1952), and Continental Ins. Co. v. I. Bahcall, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 315, 319 (E.D.
Wis. 1941). See also Castellain v. Preston, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 380; Rayner v. Preston,
[1881) 18 ch. D. 1.
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whether the cause of action sounds in contract or tort.1 3 Thus, it would
follow that in California the insurer would not be subrogated to the
vendor's cause of action against the purchaser for the balance of the
purchase price unless the purchaser wrongfully caused the loss or is
primarily responsible for it, and so, if the loss resulted through no
fault of the purchaser, the insurer would not be entitled to subrogation.
Subrogation is objectionable from another standpoint. Since the
insurance company fixes the premiums to be paid by the insured, one
may reasonably presume that when the insurance company is paid
its premium it is adequately compensated for the risk which it assumes,
and therefore, subrogation would be a windfall to the insurer and free
the insurer from a loss it had been paid to assume. However, it has
been argued that if the policy either specifically provides for subroga-
tion to the collateral rights of the insured or if the rate of the premiums
is reduced to the extent that it is in fact commensurate with the right
of subrogation and the limited risk, the insurance company should be
so subrogated. 14 In the absence of such circumstances, it is evident
that subrogation is not an adequate solution to the problem.
Application of Proceeds to Purchase Price
The second alternative would be to give the purchaser the benefit
of the vendor's insurance and apply the proceeds of the policy to the
balance of the purchase price owed by the purchaser. There have
been a number of arguments offered in favor of this view, and it is
undoubtedly the position adopted by the majority of American juris-
dictions2 5 It can be argued that refusal to give the purchaser the
benefit of the vendor's insurance works a hardship on the purchaser
and is a harsh result because the purchaser did not cause the loss and
in fact already suffered one loss by the destruction of his own unin-
sured interest in the property. Therefore, the equities of the situation
demand relief for the purchaser. In answer to this extra-legal argu-
ment, it should be noted that the purchaser could have protected him-
self by insuring his own interest or by stipulating in the sales contract
13 See In re Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958); White v. Gil-
man, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); CAL. INS. CODE § 2071.
14 Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1380, 1382-83 (1959).
15 In re Future Mfg. Co-op., 165 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Bruce v. Jennings,
190 Ga. 618, 10 S.E.2d 56 (1940); Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N.W. 235 (1935);
Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926); Sheridan v. Peninsula Say. Bank,
116 Mich. 545, 74 N.W. 874 (1898); Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20
S.W.2d 946 (1929); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74 (1921); Marion
v. Wolcott, 68 N.J.Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242 (1904); Russell v. Elliott, 42 S.D. 184, 186 N.W.
824 (1922); Dysart v. Colonial Fire Underwriters, 124 Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927);
see also Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911); Brakhage v.
Tracy, 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900); Baettie v. Gay's Express, 112 Vt. 131, 22 A.2d
169 (1941); cf. Dolan v. Spencer, 92 Colo. 389, 21 P.2d 411 (1933); (where optionee
awarded benefit of optionor's insurance); Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919,
164 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1957).
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that the risk of loss be on the vendor. A stipulation in the sales con-
tract that the purchaser is entitled to the proceeds of the vendor's
insurance requires the assent of the insurer either by a waiver of the
non-assignability clause in the insurance contract or by an endorse-
ment of the insurance by the insurer in favor of the purchaser, but
such assent can be obtained, and the purchaser can protect himself
in this manner. Having failed to protect himself, the purchaser could
be viewed as having assumed the risks and, therefore, made to bear
them.
In at least two cases,' the purchaser was held entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the insurance money collected by the vendor on the grounds
that the vendor was a constructive trustee for the purchaser and held
the insurance money in trust for him. Results such as these stem from a
confused interpretation of the relationship between vendor and pur-
chaser. Although the right of the purchaser to get specific perform-
ance of the sale contract somewhat resembles the interest of a cestui
que trust, that is as far as the trust relationship goes. The vendor is
not a trustee of the insurance money for the purchaser, the purchaser
has no equitable title to the insurance money, and the trust notion is
nothing more than an unnecessary fiction.17
Another argument proffered on the purchaser's behalf is that the
insurance money collected by the vendor is a substituted res to which
the purchaser is entitled.8 Under this argument it is maintained that
the insurance money takes the place of the property or original subject
matter of the contract which was destroyed and that the purchaser is
entitled to this substituted res as he was entitled to the property, had
it not been destroyed. The argument ignores the facts that the de-
stroyed property was already in the purchaser's possession and that
the purchaser was to bear the risk of the loss of that property. Arguing
that the insurance money is a substituted res or even a supplementary
res merely begs the question, because such an argument assumes that
the insurance money is part of the consideration to which the pur-
chaser is entitled. But whether or not the purchaser is so entitled is
the basic question.
The business world presents another argument in favor of giving
the purchaser the benefit of the vendor's insurance. Some businessmen
labor under the impression that insurance "runs" with the property,
i.e., that when one purchases property he automatically acquires the
insurance benefits that have attached thereto. That such a situation
is desirable or that the law should conform to this impression is not
16 Wm. Skinner & Sons v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 At. 85 (1900); Gillingham v.
Phelps, 5 Wash. 2d 410, 105 P.2d 825 (1940).
17 Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 CoLum. L. REv. 369, 372 (1913).
18 Doty v. Rensselaer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 App. Div. 29, 32, 176 N.Y.
Supp. 55, 57 (1919).
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here discussed. The point is that such is not now the law in California.'0
Absent a specific provision in the insurance contract to the contrary,
the insurance policy and its benefits do not pass to the purchaser of the
insured property without a valid assignment of the insurance contract.
As pointed out above, a substantial majority of the jurisdictions
that have passed on the question have given the purchaser the benefit
of the vendor's insurance.20 However, there is some authority to the
contrary. 21 In California and those states that have a similar Standard
Form Fire Insurance Policy, 22 there may be a statutory prohibition
against giving the purchaser the benefit of the vendor's insurance.
The California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy provides that the
".. . [insurer] does insure . . .[the insured's property] to the actual
cash value of the property at the time of the loss ... but not exceeding
... nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured.... 2
(Emphasis added.) Construing the provision literally, it would seem
that it precludes giving the purchaser the benefit of the vendor's in-
surance because to do so would extend the insurer's liability beyond
the interest of the insured and allow recovery to a beneficiary (the
purchaser) not named or covered in the policy. In other words, the
interest of the insured does not include the interest of the purchaser
or anyone else, and allowing the purchaser to receive the benefits of
the policy forces the insurance company to assume a risk in excess of
the insured's interest and one that is expressly prohibited by the in-
surance contract. The writer has been unable to find any California
decisions which construe this particular provision, but it is submitted
that a construction which sustains the purchaser's claim would severely
limit the purpose of the provision and deny the insurer and his insured
the benefits of their contract by substantially altering their rights,
duties and liabilities.
The classic argument against giving the purchaser the proceeds
of the vendor's insurance is that an insurance policy is a personal con-
tract between the insurer and insured, and, therefore, the benefits or
19 CAL. INS. CODE § 305; Alexander v. Security First Nat1 Bank, 7 Cal. 2d 718, 62
P.2d 735 (1936). See generally CAL. INS. CODE § 2071. To the effect that the insurance
should run with the land, see Vance, Comment, 34 YALE L. J. 87 (1924), and the dissent-
ing opinion of James, L. J., in Rayner v. Preston, [1881] 18 Ch. D 1, 12, both criticized
in Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
20 See cases collected note 15 supra.
21 Castellain v. Preston, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 380; Rayner v. Preston, [1881] 18 Ch. D.
1. These cases have been abrogated by an English statute which gives the purchaser the
benefit of the vendor's insurance. Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 16, § 105.
See U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 166 U.S. 468 (1897); White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375,
71 Pac. 436 (1903); King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95; Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239
N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); cf King v. State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 61 Mass. 1 (1851)
and compare with Tabbut v. American Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 371, 70 N.E. 430 (1904);
Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).
22 See CAL. INS. CODE § 2071.
23 Ibid.
detriments of the contract should accrue to no one but the insurer and
the insured, in the absence of a valid assignment. Thus, the benefits
of the insurance policy should not be awarded to the purchaser be-
cause the purchaser is not a party to the insurance contract and not
a contemplated beneficiary thereof. 2  This argument seems valid, and
is further fortified when one notes that allowing the purchaser to re-
cover the proceeds of the insurance policy violates the insurance com-
pany's privilege to select its insured and determine its own risk, and
ignores the fact that the purchaser and the insurer are not in privity
with each other.25
Granting relief to the purchaser is objectionable on still another
score. It is a windfall to the purchaser; he is getting the benefits of
insurance coverage without contracting or giving consideration for
them. The purchaser had an insurable interest in the property and
could have indemnified himself against loss by taking out his own
insurance or by stipulating in the sales contract that the risk of loss
be borne by the vendor.
Obviously giving the purchaser the proceeds of the vendor's in-
surance is not as good a solution to the problem as may be desired.
Whether the merits of the purchaser's contention outweigh the objec-
tions is basically an equitable consideration, rather than a legal one,
but a decision one way or the other should be withheld until an anal-
ysis of the third alternative is made.
Retention by Vendor-Insured
The third possible solution is to allow the vendor to retain the in-
surance money collected from the insurer and also recover the balance
of the purchase price from the purchaser. 26
In support of this position it can be argued that the vendor has
made two separate and distinct contracts (a sales contract with the
purchaser and an insurance contract with the insurance company) and
that he gave valuable consideration for each of these contracts and,
therefore, that he is entitled to recover on both of them. If the court
refuses to allow the vendor to recover on each of the contracts, it
would be denying the vendor the benefits for which he has bargained
and paid. The fact that the vendor's interest in the insurance contract
is limited to the amount which is owed him by the purchaser does not
seem to justify a judicial denial of one or the other of the two con-
tracts. Even though the vendor's interest may now be limited, the two
contracts are independent. One must avoid the confusion resulting
24 Castellain v. Preston, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 380; Rayner v. Preston, [1881] Ch. D. 1.
25 See generally King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TExAS L.
REv. 62, 71 (1951).
26 White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); King v. State Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 61 Mass. 1 (1851); Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 858,
79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).
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from treating the contracts as if they were one; they are separate and
distinct and should be treated as such.
An indirect argument which might be made in favor of allowing
the vendor the benefits of both of his contracts is that it is the only
one of the three available solutions which does not give the prevailing
party a windfall. When the vendor is allowed to recover the consid-
eration for which he bargained, he is getting just what he contracted
and paid for and not a windfall. Whereas, a decision in favor of the
insurer or the purchaser would definitely be a windfall to one or the
other.
The obvious argument against the vendor's recovery is that it con-
stitutes a double recovery which is obnoxious to public policy. 27 The
argument is that no one should be placed in a position to profit by a
loss because he might be tempted to cause the loss or be negligent in
preventing it. 2 8 In other words, it is contended that allowing the ven-
dor to recover under both his contracts places the vendor in a position
whereby he might profit from causing or failing to prevent destruction
of the property. While such a principle may be sound public policy in
the broad view, it is still to be decided whether or not such a policy out-
weighs a desire for sanctity of contract relations. One must measure
the merits of the public policy in terms of the possible harm that such
a policy may wreak upon contract stability. Specifically the question
may be posed: which is more desirable, to place the insured-vendor in
a position to profit by a loss and violate an established public policy
or to deny the insured-vendor the benefit of a valid contract in defer-
ence to such a policy? Neither solution is without objection, nor with-
out merit.
It is submitted, however, that the proper solution should be made
to depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case
and not upon an arbitrary ruling, applicable to all situations. At any
rate there would seem to be even less reason for such a public policy
when one considers that the vendor here is not even in possession or
control of the insured property and therefore would have less oppor-
tunity to cause or fail to prevent loss of the property than the typical
insured who has possession of the insured property. Furthermore, the
social presumption should be that one is not going to wrongfully de-
stroy property, and society has laws and punitive processes for those
who by their conduct rebut this presumption. The point is that the
deterrent influence of penal laws should be used to control an insured's
conduct, and not necessarily a policy which is itself not without
objection.
In any event the fact remains that if he is allowed to recover from
both the insurance company and the purchaser, the vendor is getting
27 Note, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 202, 203, 204 (1928); Note, 72 HAIv. L. REv. 1380,
1381 (1959).
28 See Kemochan v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 17 N.Y. 428 (1858).
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double indemnification. The argument is that all the vendor is entitled
to is recovery of the balance of the purchase price from the purchaser
or indemnification from the insurance company to the extent of the
unpaid balance of -the purchase price, but not both.
The whole enigma may be readily summarized. The vendor's in-
surable interest is limited to the amount of the unpaid purchase price
owed by the purchaser; that is, to the amount of the loss that the
vendor actually suffers. If the vendor is allowed to recover the balance
of the purchase price from the purchaser, the vendor has in fact suf-
fered no loss, and therefore, the insurance company does not have to
pay. But this is a windfall to the insurer. On the other hand, if the
vendor is not allowed to recover the balance of the purchase price
from the purchaser, because the vendor has already been indemnified
by the insurer, and the purchaser is given the benefit of the insurance
money, this is a windfall to the purchaser. Subrogating the insurer to
the vendor's rights against the purchaser for the unpaid balance is also
a windfall to the insurer. Finally, the only way to prevent a windfall
to either the purchaser or the insurer is to breach public policy by
allowing the vendor double indemnification. The court must decide
which is the least repugnant result in terms of the fact situation before
it. It is submitted that the equities in favor of the purchaser outweigh
the contract rationale proposed for the vendor and that allowing the
purchaser to prevail is the least objectionable result, but obviously none
of these solutions is adequate.
Remedies - Contract Provisions, Legislation
In view of the inherent inadequacies of the available solutions, two
further remedies are suggested: One is that remedial legislation is re-
quired, and the second is that until such time as appropriate legislation
is adopted, the parties should make specific provisions in their contracts
that will assure the result which they feel can best meet their needs.
Contract Provisions
The sales contract can provide that the purchaser is entitled to the
vendor's insurance only if the purchaser pays the insurance in the
meantime,2 9 or the vendor and the insurer can agree to an assignment
or endorsement of the insurance policy to the purchaser, and the pur-
chaser can be made to assume payment of the premiums. Possibly the
sales contract could require the purchaser to insure his own interest
and include a reasonable liquidated damages provision, payable to the
vendor, if the purchaser should fail to insure. The sales agreement
could provide that the risk of loss is upon the vendor notwithstanding
the fact that the purchaser is in possession, in which case the purchaser
29 See Raplee v. Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919, 164 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1957)
(purchaser allowed benefit of vendor's insurance because purchaser had paid the pre-
miums).
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would not be entitled to the proceeds of the vendor's insurance. Any
other such provision the parties may desire could be incorporated into
the contract.
Remedial Legislation
One or two types of remedial legislation may help solve the prob-
lem. The English solution has been to adopt a statute which conclu-
sively presumes that the vendor's insurance is held for the benefit of
the purchaser.3 0 Such legislation is advantageous in that it proscribes
all solutions other than that one which would give the purchaser the
benefit of the vendor's insurance and thereby establishes with certainty
the applicable law. If such a statute were adopted in California the
parties to a conditional sales contract would be able to determine and
provide for their insurable interests without having to anticipate or
"second-guess" a court's ruling.
Such a statute should provide that insurance attaches to and runs
with the land; that is, that an insurance policy on a piece of property
would pass to a purchaser of that property. The assent of the insurance
company to the transfer and an assumption of payment of premiums
by the purchaser would be assumed. This would give effect to the
wishes and impressions of the market place, put the insurance benefits
and burdens on the purchaser, and reach a completely equitable result.
Without attempting to overcome the mechanical problems in-
volved, there would seem to be merit in an additional type of legisla-
tion. The maximum amount of indemnification which one may recover
under a fire insurance policy decreases in a direct proportion to the
decrease of one's insurable interest therein, but the converse is not
true. Thus, when a vendor enters into a conditional contract for the
sale of his insured property, and receives payment for part of the
purchase price from the purchaser, the vendor's insurable interest and
the maximum amount he can recover on the policy decrease to the
balance of the unpaid purchase price. However, the premiums which
the vendor is required to pay remain the same, thereby giving the
insurer a windfall. If the courts or legislature of California adopt the
view that the purchaser is entitled to the proceeds of the vendor's
insurance, it is suggested that the risks and burdens of premiums be
redistributed in a fashion more equitable to the vendor, by making
the vendor's premiums commensurate with his new interest. Similarly,
if it is made the law of California that insurance passes with the con-
ditional sale of the insured property, the purchaser's assumed premi-
ums should be readjusted to match his interest.
Obviously, if a statute entitled the purchaser to the vendor's in-
surance without causing the insurance to run with the land, no vendor
would retain his previous policy after entering into a conditional sales
contract. If the vendor were to retain his policy, there would be no
30 Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 16, § 105.
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need for the purchaser to take out insurance. However, if a statute
provided that insurance does run with the property in such situations,
the purchaser would be adequately covered and be made to pay for
such coverage, the vendor could reinsure as his interest appears with
commensurate premiums, and an equitable distribution of burdens
and benefits would be achieved.
Conclusion
This comment has attempted to point out the defects in the three
non-statutory solutions to the problem of who is entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the vendor's fire insurance policy after a conditional contract
for the sale of the insured property. Each solution is objectionable in
that it constitutes a windfall or double indemnification to the prevailing
party. The anomaly lies in the difficulty of weighing the equitable
arguments propounded for the purchaser against the contract analysis
in favor of the vendor. It would seem that a windfall is less odious
than a double recovery. While the purchaser's recovery may not be
totally "just," it appears to be least inequitable. On these grounds, it
is submitted that giving the benefits of the vendor's insurance to the
purchaser is the least objectionable result, and until statutory reform
is forthcoming is the result which the California courts should adopt.
The real solution lies in remedial legislation. It is recommended
that legislation be adopted which would most effectively cause the
fire insurance on property to pass to the conditional purchaser of that
property, relieve the vendor from insuring for the purchaser and cause
the purchaser to acquire and pay for his own insurance.
In the interim, it is suggested that prospective vendors, purchasers
and insurers appreciate this quandary and make adequate provisions
in their contracts to avoid what, in the absence of provisions or legis-
lation to the contrary, seem to be inevitably inequitable results.
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